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Abstract
We present a model of tariff disputes and concessions consisting of an infinitely repeated
game under bilateral incomplete information. Given potential agreements to be reached
through unilateral or reciprocal concessions, we find that an agreement involving reciprocal
concessions is reached immediately if the discount factor is large and/or the volume of
trade is small. Otherwise prior beliefs about country type matter: when both countries hold
pessimistic priors, immediate reciprocal concessions still occur. Very different prior beliefs
lead to an immediate unilateral concession of the pessimistic country, whereas optimistic
priors coupled with low discount factors may generate delayed agreements. 1997 Elsevier
Science B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
International trade relations are generating new and severe conflicts ranging
from bilateral disputes over trade in specific sectors to issues of multilateral trade,
such as those addressed in the recent GATT round. A look at past trade disputes
reveals that some were settled very quickly while others lasted for years. Besides
differential delays in reaching agreement, resolutions of trade disputes varied also
in the type of concessions that were made (unilateral or reciprocal). The purpose of
this paper is to study the countries’ incentives in settling trade disputes, provide
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explanations for delay and take a first step toward identifying variables that may
help us understand the type of concession that we observe.
Table 1 reports several examples of trade conflicts, starting with the Anglo-
Dutch trade war of 1614–1617 over trade in unfinished cloth and extending to a
dispute between the United States and South Korea in 1986 over trade in television
programs and movies. Both of these conflicts were settled through unilateral
concessions, with the latter dispute being settled immediately while an agreement
between Holland and England was reached only after three years. The conflicts
between European nations at the end of the 19th century were also settled only
after substantial delay, most of them through unilateral concessions. The more
recent disputes between the European Community and the United States over trade
in various sectors exhibited long delays in reaching agreement through both
reciprocal and unilateral concessions.
In a detailed study of trade wars, Conybeare (1987) points to countries’
incomplete information and the resulting need for learning about their partners’
strengths as a major factor in explaining why many trade disputes take so long to
settle, despite the obvious opportunity costs involved. In this paper we formalize
this insight and examine how factors relating to the trading environment affect the
way in which conflicts are settled. The trade literature has long recognized that an
uncertain environment has an important effect on the conduct of trade policy.
Feenstra and Lewis (1991), for instance, have studied incentive-compatible trade
policies with private information about political pressure from lobby groups.
Riezman (1991) demonstrates that unobservable tariffs can prevent countries from
reaching free trade and may even lead to temporary trade conflicts if there are
random terms of trade swings. Jensen and Thursby (1988, Jensen and Thursby,
1990) have analyzed one- and two-period tariff games where governments have
private information about their objective function.
Our modeling of the information aspect is similar to that of Jensen and Thursby.
However, we embed the information problem in a fully dynamic, infinitely
repeated tariff game, which allows us to endogenize agreements and the way in
which countries settle their disputes. Our tariff game starts with a conflict phase
under two-sided incomplete information, followed by an agreement phase if
countries reach one. All agreements are required to be self-enforcing. The
countries will weigh the benefits associated with each potential agreement and
choose their concession strategies accordingly. We demonstrate that the equilib-
rium is unique, if dominated equilibria are eliminated. The equilibrium of the
overall game exhibits the types of dispute resolution identified in Table 1 (i.e.
immediate reciprocal concessions, unilateral concessions, and delay), and shows
how the type of resolution that occurs depends on the exogenous variables of the
model, such as the discount factor, prior beliefs, the volume of trade, and industry
cost characteristics.
The structure of our game and its analysis combine the use of self-enforcing
agreements from the collusion and repeated game literature (see, for instance,
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Harrington, 1991 and the many references in Tirole, 1988 and Fudenberg and
Tirole, 1991) with the use of two-sided incomplete information bargaining models
(see, for example, Chatterjee and Samuelson, 1987). The importance of incomplete
information in conflict resolution, that we stress in this paper, is also examined in
the law and economics literature in the context of negotiating out-of-court
settlements (see Cooter and Rubinfield, 1989 for a survey of and references to that
literature). In the context of international trade conflicts, several authors (e.g.
Mayer, 1981; Riezman, 1982; Grossman and Helpman, 1993) have used bargain-
ing models to derive predictions about how trade liberalizations would evolve.
These models have the advantage of predicting a unique efficient trade agreement
but they implicitly assume complete enforceability of international trade
1
agreements. In our model countries worry about preventing defections from
potential agreements, and hence take into account that potential agreements must
be self-enforcing when choosing their concession strategies. As will become
evident in our results, this leads to predictions that are different from those that
would be obtained in a ‘‘standard bargaining’’ framework. On the other hand,
there are studies (e.g. Dixit, 1987; Bagwell and Staiger, 1990; Ludema, 1991;
Riezman, 1991) that explain when low tariffs are the result of implicit cooperation
in repeated games, and agreements are thus self-enforcing. Yet, though not their
purpose, these papers do not shed any light on the process of dispute settlement. In
our paper, settlements are preceded by a conflict phase whose length is endogen-
ous. Moreover, our study explains when countries reach different kinds of
agreements.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the overall tariff game and
discusses the equilibrium concept. Section 3 defines the potential agreements and
describes the countries’ equilibrium behavior in the subgames associated with each
agreement. The overall game is solved in Section 4 where we provide comparative
statics results for different trade environments. Conclusions follow in Section 5.
2. Description of the overall tariff game
This section presents a two-country model of tariff concessions under two-sided
incomplete information. At its heart is an infinitely repeated version of the familiar
two-country optimum tariff game of Johnson (1953/54). In the Johnson game,
while both consumers and producers in each country are price-takers, governments
can influence the terms of trade through their choice of trade policy. We denote
trade taxes by x where i 5 I,II represents the country. Each country chooses tradei
1See Bagwell and Staiger (1990) and Staiger (1994) for an extensive discussion of this point, and
Furusawa (1994) for an interesting model of bargaining to reach a self-enforcing agreement. A lack of
enforcement of trade rules has often been cited as a major problem of the GATT and has therefore
played an important role in the Uruguay Round. It has also been one of the reasons why the World
Trade Organization as successor of the GATT was given larger enforcement powers.
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taxes so as to maximize social welfare. We let social welfare be given in indirect
form as a continuous function of tariffs, w (x ,x ). Country i’s static best reply toi i j
the other country’s tariff x is implicitly defined by ›w (x ,x ) /›x 5 0. We denotej i i j j
*i’s best-reply function by x (x ). The game starts from an inefficient level ofi j
H Hprotection described by the tariff pair x ,x (the ‘‘status quo’’ point). The
H H
corresponding status-quo welfare w (x ,x ) is normalized to zero. We make thei
following standard assumptions:
HAssumption 1. (i) w is positive for all x ,x [ [0,x ); it is quasiconcave, increasingi i j
*in x up to the optimal tariff x (x ) and decreasing thereafter. (ii) Given x , w isi i j i i
H *decreasing in x . (iii) For all x [ [0,x ], x (x ) is non-prohibitive, and 0 ,j j i j
H H*x (x ) , x .i
The static best-reply functions under this set of assumptions are illustrated in
Fig. 1. Tariffs are strategic substitutes in the stage game played by two type L
*countries: country i’s best reply x (x ) is a decreasing function of country j’s tariffi j
2
x . The intersection of best-reply functions represents a static Nash equilibrium forj
type L countries.
Fig. 1. The stage game
2For further details on strategic policies in a two-country world, see the classic paper by Johnson
(1953/54), or McMillan (1986) or Bagwell and Staiger (1990). The assumption that tariffs are strategic
substitutes is not crucial for our general results below and therefore does not appear in the propositions
of Section 4.
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Initially tariff policy is made under incomplete information in that each
government knows its own indirect utility function but not that of the other
government. We assume that each government can be of two types: a high-tariff
type (type H) and a low-tariff type (type L), distinguished by the form of their
welfare and best-reply functions. The prior distribution on types p 5 prob(countryi
i is of type L) is common knowledge.
An example of this type of information problem is given by Jensen and Thursby
(1990, p. 48): a low-tariff government chooses trade taxes to maximize the
aggregate welfare of its citizens, whereas a high-tariff type’s objective function
reflects the interest of certain pressure groups. In an earlier paper, Jensen and
Thursby (1988) show how a majority voting model with special interest groups
can generate such objective functions. We model information incompleteness in a
H
similar way, but specify that a type H country keeps the initial high tariff level x
in all circumstances (see Fig. 1), whereas a type L country would potentially want
to cut its trade taxes. While this formulation exaggerates the inflexibility of a
high-tariff country, the model still generates the reputation-building behavior
Jensen and Thursby show to be relevant in the context of incomplete information.
The analytical advantage of our formulation is that it is easier to handle the
Hinformation transmission process over time. For instance, any deviation from x
reveals the same amount of information.
Throughout the paper, we will focus on the strategies and work with the welfare
only of type L countries. This, of course, does not mean that both countries are
known as type L, but rather that the behavior of the type H is already transparent.
The tariff game described above is the stage game of our infinitely repeated
overall game. The discount factor between periods is the same for both countries
and denoted by d, where 0 , d , 1. The overall game starts in period one with the
‘‘conflict phase’’, possibly followed by an ‘‘agreement phase’’. An agreement here
is not a contract that can be enforced by a court of law, but rather an equilibrium
of the subgame extending from the first concession. Our model thus satisfies a
potentially important requirement of trade agreements: in the absence of effective
mechanisms to enforce international contracts, such agreements should be self-
enforcing. It also captures another feature of trade conflicts where the expected
(endogenous) welfare in the post-agreement phase affects the countries’ incentives
to make concessions.
To keep track of the transmission of information between the countries, we
decompose the countries’ strategy sets in each stage game into two elements: (i)
whether to make a concession and, if yes, then (ii) by how much to lower tariffs.
That is, in each period, the type L of each country first decides independently on
its mixed concession strategy denoted r [ [0,1], a probability distribution over the
two pure actions: to make or not to make a concession. The realization of r is
ˆdenoted r. Once concession strategies are observed, a conceding country will also
have to decide on how much to reduce its tariff. Given the tariff strategies, the
countries enjoy their corresponding welfares and the game proceeds to the next
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3 t t t t t
ˆ ˆperiod. Formally, let a 5 (hr ,x j;hr ,x j) be the actions observed in period t,I I II II
t 1 2 t21
and define the history of the play by h 5 (a ,a , . . . ,a ). In the overall game, for
i 5 I,II indexing the countries, a mixed concession strategy is a sequence of maps,
tr , one for each period t, from possible histories into [0,1]. In any period, a tariffi
t t H
strategy of the type L is a mapping x :h 3 h0,1j 3 h0,1j → [0,x ] such thati
t H t H
x [ [0,x ) if country i concedes, and x 5 x if it does not. The domain of x isi i i
restricted to the realized value of the concession strategy because the decision on
whether to make a concession precedes the one on the amount of the concession
(the tariff strategy). Each country will use the opponent’s previous (possibly
ˆmixed) concession strategy to update its beliefs via Bayes’ rule. Recalling that r
denotes the realized value of r, country i’s belief in period t is a function
t t21 t21p :t → [0,1] such that, given p and r ,j j j
s
ˆ1 if r 5 1 for any s , t;j
t21 t21t p (1 2 r )p 5 j jj s]]]]]]]] ˆif r 5 0 for all s , t.5 t21 t21 t21 jp (1 2 r ) 1 (1 2 p )j j j
Now for the definition of an agreement:
t t t tDefinition 1. For t . T, we say that the strategy profile (hr ,x j,hr ,x j) is anI I II II
agreement reached at date T if it constitutes a perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE)
of the game extending from date t, such that optimal concession strategies are
t
always pure and remain constant, where at least one country plays hr j 5I
h1,1,1, . . . j.
An agreement in our model will fall into one of three broad classes, each
corresponding to a particular subgame of the overall game. These three subgames,
4
called RR, RN and NR, themselves consist of infinitely repeated stage games. In
accordance with the definition of an agreement, we require the equilibria of these
subgames to be PBE. An agreement leading to the RR-game involves the play of
3The decomposition of strategies is technically useful because dealing with randomizations over a
binary choice set hconcede, don’t concedej is easier than over a continuum of tariff strategies.
Furthermore, the concession decision is crucial in determining the evolution of the overall game.
Treating concession strategies separately highlights the transmission of information. A plausible
alternative structure for the stage game, suggested by a referee, would be to have the concession and
tariff strategies determined simultaneously. The discounted welfares corresponding to potential
R
agreements we define in the next section and the tariff x corresponding to a unilateral concession
would not change. A difference, however, would occur during the period in which the conflict phase is
resolved through bilateral concessions because tariff strategies would be determined under incomplete
information, and an agreement would be reached one period later. This implies a change in the
statement of the countries’ expected discounted payoffs associated with the bilateral concessions
RR
outcome, V in Eq. (6) and Eq. (7). It is therefore possible that such a change would affect ouri
conclusions.
4R and N stand for ‘‘reducing’’ and ‘‘not reducing’’, respectively.
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HPBE strategies according to which both countries reduce tariffs below x . Both
countries reveal their types, thus the RR-game is a repeated complete information
game between two type L countries. As for the RN-game, it extends from the
period where only country I concedes and makes a unilateral reduction, and the
type L of country II pools with the type H. The opposite outcome occurs in the
NR-game: country II concedes and country I becomes the informed player. We will
show later that no additional type-information is revealed in either the RN or the
NR-game, so the informed country’s optimal tariff strategy is to maintain x (andH
hence, r 5 0) indefinitely.
t tLet V and V denote respectively I’s and II’s expected discounted welfares asI II
viewed from period t. A PBE of the overall game is a pair of sequences of
t t* *concession strategies hr j, hr j and tariff strategies of type L countries suchI II
t t tthat, given h and consistent beliefs hp j and hp j,I II
t t t t t t t* * *V (hr j,hr j) $V (hr j,hr j) for all hr j (1)I I II I I II I
t t t t t t t* * *V (hr j,hr j) $V (hr j,hr j) for all hr j (2)II I II II I II II
Tariff strategies are omitted for conciseness; they are implicit in Eq. (1) and Eq.
5(2). By definition of an agreement, the PBE concession strategies during the
agreement phase can take only two values (1 or 0); in the conflict phase they are
drawn from the interval [0,1]. Of course, the overall game may exhibit an
equilibrium in pure concession strategies. We shall then argue that an agreement is
reached immediately.
3. Analysis of potential agreements and subgames
We proceed in this section with the analysis of the three potential subgames and
define the agreements corresponding to each. As mentioned, each of these
subgames is characterized by an infinitely repeated stage game with a particular
information structure. The evolution of the conflict will determine which subgame
will be reached, but this question is relegated to Section 4.
Consider the stage game played under complete information and let us introduce
the following notation for future reference. The symmetric, static Nash equilibrium
Etariff in the stage game where both players are of type L is denoted by x , and the
E E H
corresponding welfare by w 5 w(x ,x ). We denote the static best reply to x by
]R H*x 5 x (x ), which is the tariff strategy of a type L country that concedes
unilaterally. The welfare of the type L of country I playing against a type H is
5See Fudenberg and Tirole (1991) for an extensive treatment of the PBE concept. Basically, the
concept requires that strategies be sequentially optimal given players’ beliefs and that beliefs be
updated according to Bayes’ rule whenever possible (along the equilibrium path).
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R R H H R
represented by w 5 w (x ,x ) 5 w (x ,x ), where the last equality follows fromI II
N H Rthe symmetry of the welfare functions. Finally, we have w 5 w (x ,x ) 5I
N
w (x ,x ), where w is the stage-game welfare of a type L country that enjoys theII R H
unilateral concession of its opponent. Throughout the paper, we shall assume
Assumption 2.
N
w .w.
]
Assumption 2 is illustrated in Fig. 1. It states that country I prefers the tariff pair
H R R H(x ,x ) and country II prefers (x ,x ) to the static complete-information equilib-
E E
rium (x ,x ). That is, under incomplete information, a country will keep its
H
status-quo tariff x if it is convinced that the other country will concede, but will
reduce its tariffs if it is sufficiently likely that the other country will not. If
Assumption 2 does not hold, the two types always ‘‘separate’’. Under Assumption
2, however, equilibria may involve reputation building and delay, and interesting
questions like ‘‘under what conditions do we observe delay?’’ and ‘‘for how long
will a conflict last?’’ arise.
The first subgame we focus on is the RR-game (it is common knowledge that
t tboth countries are of type L). Let p 5 (hx j,hx j) be a path consisting of a pair ofI II
t Hinfinite sequences of tariff strategies x [ [0,x ]. Then, country i’s discountedi
welfare associated with the path p is
‘
t21 t tV ( p) 5Od w (x , x ). (3)i i I II
t51
E ELet the path p 5 (hx j,hx j) be the punishment path, consisting of the repeated0
Eplay of the static Nash equilibrium tariff x ad infinitum. It is well known that the
strategies along p form a subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) of the RR-game,0
hence a PBE and a potential agreement. Our approach is to focus on equilibria that
yield a welfare pair on the welfare possibility frontier, that is, the set of
(constrained) optimal welfare pairs as a function of the discount factor. Allowing
for dominated agreements as expected outcomes of the RR-game only enlarges the
set of potential outcomes, but these outcomes can easily be characterized in terms
of the equilibrium classification to be introduced in Section 4. Here we consider
the symmetric, efficient PBE, which can be interpreted as the ‘‘focal equilibrium’’
6
of the RR-game.
tA PBE of the RR-game is characterized by the concession strategies r 5 1 fori
6Our justification for picking the efficient symmetric equilibrium as the focal point is twofold: first, in a
symmetric game the equilibrium should not change if we just exchange the names of the two countries;
this property is satisfied only for symmetric equilibria. Second, we would like to focus on ex ante
efficient equilibria, since the model does not provide any economic intuition for why countries should
play ones that are not. Instead we concentrate on inefficiencies that arise in the process of playing ex
ante undominated equilibria.
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i 5 I,II and the two paths defined above, p the initial path and p the punishment0
path, such that no country has any incentive to deviate, be it from the path p or the
path p that is followed. If any country deviates from p, the play switches to the0
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯path p . Let w 5 w(x,x ), where x maximizes w(x,x) subject to0
¯ * ¯ ¯w $ (1 2 d )w (x (x ), x ) 1 dw. (4)i i ]
¯Eq. (4) is the ‘‘subgame-perfection’’ constraint (explained in the sequel), and x is
the most cooperative tariff that can be a PBE strategy for a given d. We now
introduce Agreement RR.
¯Agreement RR. Countries initially follow the path p along which tariffs are x. The
game proceeds on this path as long as no deviation occurs. Any deviation from p
leads to the punishment path p being followed indefinitely.0
It is easy to verify that Agreement RR is self-enforcing, that is, the strategies
described therein form a PBE. The left-hand side of Eq. (4) represents the
maximum welfare that can be supported through the threat of reverting to the path
p , along which the static Nash equilibrium is repeated forever. The country0
* ¯ ¯deviating from p obtains w (x (x ),x ) in the actual period and w thereafter. Thei i ]
sum of the two, appropriately discounted, appears on the right-hand side of Eq.
(4). Thus, if Eq. (4) is satisfied, no country will have any incentive to deviate from
x¯. Finally, since the strategies along the punishment path p form a PBE, the0
strategies described in Agreement RR constitute a PBE as well. We have
* ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯w(x (x ),x ) . w .w, and the tariff x appearing in Agreement RR maximizes w(x,x)i ]
under the subgame-perfection constraint (Eq. (4)).
Consider now one of the two other potential subgames, for example, the
NR-game (the analysis of the RN-game is similar). At the beginning of this
subgame, beliefs are respectively p 5 1 and p [ [0,1), thus country I is theII I
informed player. In Proposition 1 we shall refer to Eq. (5), which states that
H R
country I’s average welfare under the tariffs x 5 x , x 5 x (with correspondingI II
concession strategies r 5 0, r 5 1) is strictly higher than the average welfare itI II
7
obtains under Agreement RR.
N
¯w . w. (5)
RAgreement NR. Country II reduces its tariff to x while country I keeps its tariff at
H
x . These tariffs will prevail indefinitely. It is understood that if country I ever
reduces its tariff (deviates to r 5 1) this agreement is replaced by Agreement RR,I
but that country II’s deviations are ignored.
Proposition 1. Under Eq. (5), the strategies described in Agreement NR constitute
a PBE of the NR-game. On the other hand, Agreement RR applies if Eq. (5) does
not hold.
7
¯Note that Eq. (5) implies Assumption 2 because w $w, but the reverse is not true.
]
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Proof. It is common knowledge that country II is of type L, thus its threat to keep
Hits tariff at x is not credible, and ruled out by the ‘‘perfectness’’ requirement.
R HCountry II’s best tariff strategy is thus x as long as x 5 x . Since both types ofI
country I play r 5 0, country II’s beliefs remain constant along the path describedI
in Agreement NR. Nor will country I deviate from (r 5 0,x ), because otherwiseI H
it reveals its type and the game collapses to the RR-game, which leads to
N
¯Agreement RR. Under Eq. (5), this deviation yields the average welfare w , w
for country I. Thus the strategies described above are optimal for all periods where
Agreement NR applies, and beliefs are consistent with equilibrium strategies. We
conclude that the strategies described in Agreement NR form a PBE. Clearly, this
is not true if Eq. (5) does not hold. Q.E.D.
Exchanging the positions of the two countries in Agreement NR yields trivially
Agreement RN for the RN-game. In both the NR and the RN-game, the conceding
H
country reduces its tariff, while the informed country keeps x . The reason why
this situation persists is that the informed country’s type cannot be verified; there
is a probability (however small) that the informed country is of type H. Since the
concept of PBE effectively eliminates empty threats of the conceding country of
Hthe form ‘‘I will reset my tariffs to x if you (the informed country) do not reduce
your tariffs now’’, the conceding country is bound to play the game as if it were
facing a type-H country.
The necessary condition for Agreement RN or NR to be reached is Eq. (5), and
one of the crucial factors determining whether Eq. (5) holds is the discount factor
¯ ¯through its effect on w. To see the impact of d on w, we rearrange Eq. (4) and
obtain
* ¯ ¯ ¯w (x (x ),x ) 2 wi i
]]]]]¯d(w ) $ . (6)
* ¯ ¯w (x (x ),x ) 2wi i ]
¯Eq. (6) defines the set of discount factors d [ [d(w ),1] that support a given
¯average welfare w as a PBE outcome of the RR game. Alternatively, we can define
¯the maximum w that can be supported given the discount factor. This is obtained
from Eq. (6) holding with equality. It follows that the lower is the discount factor,
the lower is the maximum welfare that can be supported in Agreement RR, and
¯thus the more likely Eq. (5) is to hold. In particular, w →w as d → 0, and Eq. (5)
]
will actually hold.
Having defined the three potential agreements, we close this section with the
following proposition, which is a direct implication of the fact that the equilibria
associated with all agreements are self-enforcing.
Proposition 2. In no equilibrium of the overall game are Agreements RN and NR
ever renegotiated for Agreement RR. Nor is Agreement RR ever replaced by
Agreement RN or NR in any equilibrium.
We have thus specified the expected average welfares of the two countries for
494 M. Bac, H. Raff / Journal of International Economics 42 (1997) 483 –504
the three potential agreements. Given these welfares, we proceed backwards to the
analysis of the conflict phase.
4. The conflict phase and potential agreements
Since countries are forward-looking in choosing their concession strategies
during the conflict phase, how the expected welfares associated with the RR-game
compare with those of the NR- or RN-game is a critical issue. This is explicit in
Eq. (7) and Eq. (8), the expressions for the countries’ expected discounted
welfares at the outset of the overall game. Recall that we are concerned only with
1 1the behavior of the type L, and that p and p denote the prior beliefs of countryI II
II and I, respectively.
1 1 1 1 RR 1 1 RNV 5 r r p V 1 (1 2 r p )Vf gI I II II I II II I
1 1 1 NR 1 1 2
1 (1 2 r ) r p V 1 (1 2 r p )dV , (7)f gI II II I II II I
1 1 1 1 RR 1 1 RNV 5 r r p V 1 (1 2 r p )Vf gII II I I II I I II
1 1 1 NR 1 1 2
1 (1 2 r ) r p V 1 (1 2 r p )dV . (8)f gII I I II I I II
1 1In the expression of V , the squared bracket following r represents country i’si i
expected discounted welfare from its immediate unilateral concession, and the one
1following (1 2 r ), from keeping the status-quo tariff in period one. Combinationsi
of R and N appear in the superscript of V to denote country i’s expectedi
discounted welfare from the three potential agreements, RR, RN and NR. The
RR RN NR
expressions of V , V and V are obtained as follows. If both countries realizei i i
a concession in the first period, the RR-game begins and the countries obtain the
¯symmetric average payoff w(d ) under Agreement RR. These arguments can be
combined to yield
‘
w¯(d )RR RR t21 ]]¯V 5V 5Od w(d ) 5 . (9)I II 1 2 dt51
Since concession strategies may be mixed, when and which agreement the
countries will reach is uncertain. As Eq. (7) and Eq. (8) show, the probability of
1 1 1
reaching Agreement RR immediately, with a little abuse of notation, is r r pI II II
1 1 1from the perspective of country I, and r r p from the perspective of country II.II I I
If only country I concedes, the game collapses to the RN-game, and Agreement
RN applies. In this case, we have
‘ R
wRN t21 R ]]V 5Od w 5 (10)I 1 2 dt51
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and
‘ N
wRN t21 N ]]V 5Od w 5 . (11)II 1 2 dt51
Eq. (10) and Eq. (11) can easily be adapted to the symmetric case, the
RN NR NR RNNR-game: we have V 5V , and V 5V . Last, if no concession occurs inI II I II
the first period, beliefs are updated and the game proceeds to period two with
2 2
expected discounted welfares given by dV and dV , respectively. The status-quoI II
tariffs cannot persist indefinitely, however:
Proposition 3. An agreement will be reached at a finite date T with probability
one, if at least one country is of type L.
tProof. Suppose, on the contrary, that hr j 5 h0,0, . . . j for i 5 I,II and t 5i
t 1 t21 t
ˆ1,2,3, . . . , together with consistent beliefs p 5 p if r 5 0 and p 5 1 ifi i i i
t21rˆ 5 1 form a PBE. Let country I be of type L. Given country II’s prescribedi
T
strategy r 5 0, country I’s expected discounted welfare from deviating (conced-II
R t T 11ing) at date T is w /(1 2 d ), whereas playing r 5 0 for t $ T yields dV . If, asI I
T T 11 T
assumed, the latter strategy is optimal, then V 5 dV . However, since r 5 0,I I II
the subgames extending from periods T and T 1 1 have exactly the same structure,
T T 11 T Thence V 5V . This leads to V (1 2 d ) 5 0, or V 5 0. Thus, deviating inI I I I
period T enhances the welfare of country I, a contradiction. Q.E.D.
We can now proceed to characterize the PBE of the overall game, starting with
pure concession strategies. Any pair of sequences of zeros and ones that satisfies
the consistency requirement of beliefs is a candidate for a PBE in pure concession
strategies. If strictly dominated equilibria are ruled out, however, Proposition 4
below stipulates that in any PBE involving the play of pure concession strategies,
8
at least one of the countries concedes (an agreement is reached) immediately.
1 1Proposition 4. If (hr j,hr j) form a PBE in pure concession strategies, then eitherI II
1 1 1hr j 5 h1,1, . . . j for i 5 I,II, or hr j 5 h0,0, . . . j and hr j 5 h1,1, . . . j for i – j.i i j
Proof. Since play in the agreement phase proceeds through pure concession
strategies, it is sufficient to show that an agreement will be reached in period one if
only pure concession strategies are allowed. Suppose, then, that Agreement RN is
signed at some date t . 1. At the beginning of period t (before concession
8An exception arises if we allow the countries to play strictly dominated equilibria. We thus assume that
given the values of relevant parameters, if there are two equilibria such that one yields ex ante both
countries a higher expected discounted welfare than the other, countries play the equilibrium associated
with higher expected discounted welfares.
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t 1
strategies are played) beliefs are equal to priors: p 5 p for i 5 I,II. This impliesi i
that the structure of the game at date t is exactly the same as in the outset. Country
I will deviate from the proposed equilibrium strategies and concede in period one;
t21 t21 Rdoing so will enhance its welfare by o ]d w , and Agreement RN will bei51
reached without delay. The same argument can be used for Agreement NR.
Finally, proceeding in pure defection strategies to reach Agreement RR at some
future date is strictly dominated by reciprocal concessions in period one if d , 1
(because both parties avoid discounting the corresponding gains). Q.E.D.
The question of when the countries reach an agreement immediately is studied
below. Let us define d , a critical value of the discount factor, byc
N
w¯(d ) 5 w . (12)c
That is, if d 5 d , the highest welfare that can be supported in Agreement RR isc
Njust equal to w , the average welfare that country I obtains under Agreement NR
(or country II obtains under Agreement RN). Eq. (5) holds for d , d , and forc
discount factors greater than d countries will prefer Agreement RR. Proposition 5c
below characterizes PBE of the overall game in pure concession strategies.
Proposition 5. Assume Assumptions 1 and 2.
Case (1): (d $ d ). A unique PBE exists in which the countries reach Agreementc
RR immediately through reciprocal concessions. The corresponding strategies are:
1 1* * ¯ ¯ ¯hr j 5 h1,1, . . . j and hx j 5 hx,x, . . . j for i 5 I,II, where x is defined throughi i
1 1Eq. (4) and beliefs form the sequence hp j 5 hp ,1,1, . . . j.i i
Case (2): (d , d ). There exists a critical region of priors defined by thec
1
¯ ¯function p(d):(0,d ] → [0,1], such that, if p # p(d) for i 5 I,II, the equilibrium isc i
as described in case (1), that is, Agreement RR is reached immediately. On the
1 1
¯other hand, if p # p(d) , p , then Agreement RN or NR is reached immediatelyi j
1 *through unilateral concessions. The corresponding strategies are hr j 5i
1 H H 1 1* * *h0,0, . . . j, hx j 5 hx ,x , . . . j for country i, and hr j 5 h1,1, . . . j, hx j 5i j j
hx ,x , . . . j for country j.R R
1 1 1 1* *Corresponding sequences of beliefs are hp j 5 hp ,p , . . . j and hp j 5i i i j
1 1
¯hp ,1,1, . . . j. No PBE in pure concession strategies exist if p . p(d) for i 5 I,II.j i
Proof. See Appendix A.
We now sum up and sharpen the results obtained so far. With probability one,
Agreement RR emerges without delay in either one of the two cases: (i) the
discount factor is high (d $ d ), (ii) the discount factor is low and both priorc
beliefs do not exceed a critical level associated with this discount factor. Case (ii)
is depicted in Fig. 2 by the shaded area. The inclusion of incomplete information
has no impact on the pattern of tariffs in these two cases. On the other hand, very
asymmetric prior beliefs coupled with low discount factors may lead to Agreement
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Fig. 2. Equilibria for d ,dc
9RN or Agreement NR. Countries that hold ‘‘pessimistic’’ prior beliefs make
unilateral concessions on tariffs. This is intuitive: if it is very likely that the other
country is of type H, it is not worthwhile waiting for its concession. As
Proposition 6 shows, however, the foregoing discussion does not imply that no
country will concede if both are ‘‘optimistic’’ initially.
1
¯Proposition 6. Under Assumptions 1 and 2, d , d and p(d) , p , 1 for i 5 I,II.c i
t t* *A unique PBE initially in mixed concession strategies (hr j,hr j) and a finiteI II
integer T . 1 exist such that an agreement is reached at date T with probability
one.
Proof. See Appendix A.
The outcome described in Proposition 6 is a war of attrition. The necessary
conditions for this outcome are a low discount factor and optimistic conjectures
about types. A low discount factor reduces the incentives to reach Agreement RR
because the highest average welfare that can be sustained through cooperation is
Nlow. It can even be lower than w , the average welfare of a type L who conceals
its type provided that the other country concedes. The usual interpretation of the
2rDdiscount factor is that of pure time preference, i.e. d 5 e where D is the length
9 HAn additional implication of the assumption that a type-H country always imposes tariff x is that in
Agreements NR and RN countries cannot coordinate as they do in Agreement RR on a more
cooperative outcome with lower tariffs. This makes Agreement RR appear more attractive. We are
grateful to a referee for pointing this out.
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of a period in which tariff strategies remain fixed, and r is the rate of time
preference. In our context, r would be much affected by ‘‘public choice
considerations’’ (election cycles, importance of unemployment and other urgent
domestic economic problems, etc.). Our results thus can easily be reformulated
10
using the negative relationship between d and r (or D).
If the discount factor is low but both prior beliefs are high, the countries conceal
their types each hoping that the other will concede. However, the potential gains
from pooling with the type H are unknown, hence countries hesitate between
conceding and maintaining the status-quo tariff. The expected payoff from
conceding in each period equals the expected payoff from ‘‘holding out’’, given
the other country’s random concession strategy. This indifference condition holds
throughout the equilibrium path; concession strategies initially are completely
mixed, until one country (or both) concedes as a result of these randomizations, or
one country (or both) becomes so pessimistic about facing a type L country that it
chooses a pure concession strategy at some finite period T.
We have characterized the PBE of the overall game in terms of the discount
factor and prior beliefs. We now investigate the relationship between the
parameters of the trade environment and the type of concession strategies that will
be observed in equilibrium. The relevant condition that we need to interpret is Eq.
(13), under which country I prefers to make a concession rather than to wait for
11
one more period given that the type L country II will concede immediately:
1 N 1 R
¯p (w(d ) 2 w ) 1 (1 2 p )w (1 2 d ) $ 0. (13)II II
An equivalent condition holds for country II. Whether Eq. (13) is satisfied depends
1 1
¯(for given d, p and p ) on the exogenous factors that affect the welfares w(d ),I II
N R
w and w , each associated with different potential agreements.
HConsider first an increase in x , the initial (status quo) tariff level. This increases
the severity of the information problem, in the sense that information about the
opponent’s type becomes more payoff-relevant. While the cooperative welfare
R
w(d ) does not change, conceding unilaterally becomes less profitable (w is strictly
Hdecreasing in x ); and keeping the status-quo tariffs when the other country
N
concedes becomes more attractive, provided that x is not too large (w is thenH
10An interesting alternative interpretation of d is as the probability that the trade relationship between
the two countries will continue for another period. That is, it could be thought of as the probability that
an event that would put the trade relationship at risk (e.g. a war, a severe economic downturn) does not
happen. Both of these interpretations appear relevant for the early 1930s, the time of the Great
Depression during which trade tensions ran extremely high and countries were unable to reach a
cooperative trade agreement (see Table 1).
11The condition in Eq. (13) is derived in the proof of Proposition 5.
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H 12
strictly increasing in x ). Under this last condition, therefore, a trade war and
unilateral concessions are more likely to occur the more severe is the information
problem.
Further results can be obtained by parameterizing the stage game. This can be
done in various ways. Here we consider two examples of stage games, each of
which exhibits features that appear interesting in light of Table 1: the use of tariffs
or export subsidies to protect individual sectors. In order to economize on space,
13
we move directly to a discussion of the results.
In a static partial-equilibrium tariff game social welfare w can be expressedi
findirectly as a function of tariff levels x and the free-trade volume of trade V , asi
shown in Bagwell and Staiger (1990). Given the stage-game welfare functions, we
N R H
¯can compute w, w and w as functions of the trade volume. If the initial tariff x
is not too small, we find that immediate reciprocal concessions are more likely to
occur the smaller is the underlying volume of trade in the sector. In sectors with a
high potential trade volume, by contrast, conflict settlement is more likely to
involve delay and unilateral concessions. The reason is that as the trade volume
goes up, defection from a cooperative agreement becomes more profitable and the
¯cooperative tariff level x has to rise to prevent defections. As a result, the
N
¯cooperative welfare w increases more slowly with the trade volume than w ,
H H Nprovided that x is sufficiently large. Moreover, for large enough x , w increases
R
more quickly in trade volume than w .
Finally, consider a two-step stage game in which governments first choose
export subsidies to maximize producer surplus minus the subsidy payment, and
then firms (one from each country) compete in the world market in a Cournot
fashion (see Brander and Spencer, 1985 for a more general formulation). Letting xi
denote the subsidy paid by the government of country i to its firm, country I’s
welfare function can be expressed as w (x ,x ,c) where c is the marginalI I II
production cost, assumed constant and identical across firms. Calculating the
welfare terms that appear in Eq. (13), it can be shown that if status-quo subsidies
are relatively small, immediate reciprocal concessions are more likely to occur the
lower the marginal costs of the firms involved. On the other hand, when marginal
costs are high, delay and unilateral concessions should occur more frequently. The
R
¯reason for this result is the following: as c rises, w and also w fall more quickly
12 N H HHow w changes with x can easily be seen in Fig. 1. There, x has been drawn at a level at which
H N N H
any change in x would lower w . To the left of this level w is strictly increasing in x , to the right it
is strictly decreasing.
13A more detailed version of this analysis is available from the authors upon request. The key step in
¯this analysis is to explicitly compute w(d ), the welfare in the symmetric undominated equilibrium of
Agreement RR. This is accomplished by first solving for the lowest protection level that satisfies Eq.
(4) with equality and then substituting the result into the stage-game welfare function. That is, we
*¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯calculate x such that w(x,x ) 5 (1 2 d )w (x (x ), x ) 1 dw, and then determine w(d ) 5 w(x(d ),x(d )).i i
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Nthan w , therefore the opportunity cost of waiting for the other country’s
concession tends to decrease, making both countries more eager to wait for their
opponent to move.
5. Conclusions
The purpose of this paper was to develop a model that would allow us to
examine two stylized facts regarding the settlement of trade disputes: delay in
reaching agreement, and the occurrence of both reciprocal and unilateral conces-
sions. Two crucial ingredients of our model were: (i) governments, at least
initially, are uncertain about the objective functions of their opponents, i.e. about
whether the other government would be willing to make a concession to end the
dispute; (ii) agreements to end a conflict must be self-enforcing, i.e. they must be
based on credible threats and promises.
The key to determine whether a conflict is ended immediately through
reciprocal concessions or dragged out and/or settled through unilateral conces-
sions is a comparison between a country’s expected discounted welfare from
making a concession, thus potentially reaching a cooperative agreement with the
other country, and from waiting for one more period for a concession by its trading
partner. Factors that make a cooperative agreement less profitable or harder to
sustain make delay and unilateral concessions more likely. Among them are: low
discount factors; a large underlying volume of trade in the disputed sector; and, in
the case of a conflict over export subsidies, high (low) marginal costs when the
status-quo subsidies are low (high). Most of these predictions of the model are
testable and future empirical research is needed to check how they hold up to the
data.
Several other extensions may also be of interest. To obtain more specific results
for countries with asymmetric stage-game payoffs or asymmetric discount factors,
one would need to find a reasonable focal point for Agreement RR, especially for
situations in which free trade is not feasible. Existing bargaining solutions may not
be useful here because they do not take into account that players may deviate from
an agreement in order to enjoy asymmetric deviation gains. Such deviation gains,
however, should influence the choice of the focal point. A potentially useful
approach may be to combine elements from both noncooperative and cooperative
game theory, as suggested by Harrington (1991) and Furusawa (1994). One could
also relax the assumption of stationarity of the trading environment. This extension
may provide an interesting way of addressing the question as to whether the
formation of regional trading blocks impedes the process of multilateral trade
liberalization. One of the key concerns here, expressed for example by Bagwell
and Staiger (1993), is that regional trade agreements lead to trade diversion, which
in turn may affect the countries’ incentives to support freer multilateral trade. In
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the context of our model, if countries anticipate trade diversion to occur, the
expected future gains from the potential types of agreements (RR, RN and NR)
will be affected, which may thus have an effect on both the type of the multilateral
agreement reached and delay before settling disputes. We intend to explore this
issue further in the future.
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Appendix A
Proof of Proposition 5
The proof consists of deriving the best reply functions, which are then used in
constructing the equilibria described in the proposition. Note that the best reply
functions will have symmetric properties. Consider first country I. It has two
1
choices in period one: it can set r 5 1 and thus reveal its type, or it can choose toI
1 1
conceal its type in the first period (r 5 0). Suppose that country I sets r 5 1.I I
Then according to Proposition 4 two things can happen. If country II also
1
concedes, r 5 1, the game collapses to the RR-game; the countries behave asII
¯they do in the PBE of this game, which yields them both the average welfare w(d ).
1If country II chooses r 5 0, then the RN-game will be played, providing countryII
R 1I with a welfare of w each period. On the other hand, if country I selects r 5 0,I
its welfare is determined as follows. If country II has conceded, then country I will
2 N
choose hr j 5 h0,0, . . . j for a gain of w each period (Agreement NR). OtherwiseI
R
country I will concede in period two and obtain w after receiving a welfare of
1 1
zero in the first period. Thus country I prefers r 5 1 to r 5 0 wheneverI I
R N R
w¯(d ) w w dw1 1 1 1S D S D S D]] ]] ]] ]]S Dp 1 (1 2 p ) $ p 1 (1 2 p ) 0 1 ,II II II II1 2 d 1 2 d 1 2 d 1 2 d
or
1 N 1 R
¯p (w(d ) 2 w ) 1 (1 2 p )w (1 2 d ) $ 0. (A.1)II II
1Clearly, if d $ d , Eq. (A.1) holds no matter the value of p , which implies thatc II
country I chooses the first option mentioned above. Using the symmetry property,
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1
we can see that hr j 5 h1,1, . . . j, i 5 I,II, form a PBE if d $ d , which proves casei c
(1).
N
¯Consider now the case d , d . Since w(d ) 2 w , 0, the left-hand side of Eq.c
1
¯(A.1) must be decreasing in p . Define the schedule p(d ) by the functionII
(0,d ] → [0,1], such that Eq. (A.1) holds with equality. Given d , d , we obtain thec c
1
¯equilibrium in case (1) if p # p(d ) for i 5 I,II. Inspection of Eq. (A.1) revealsi
1 1
¯that, for the case of asymmetric beliefs, p # p(d ) , p , the strategies describedi j
in the proposition form a PBE: Eq. (A.1) holds for country j, it therefore chooses
1*hr j 5 h1,1, . . . j no matter what the strategy of country i. Given this strategy ofj
1*country j, the best reply of country i is to set hr j 5 h0,0, . . . j if its prior beliefi
1p is low enough. The postulated sequences of beliefs are consistent with thej
strategies. Finally, the non-existence of a pure concession strategy equilibrium if
1p¯(d ) , p for i 5 I,II, so that both countries are optimistic enough, can bei
checked similarly. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 6
We know by Proposition 3 that the countries will surely reach an agreement if at
least one country is of type L. If an agreement is reached at date T, then at least
¯one of the two beliefs at date T must be less than or equal to p(d ). So we consider
T T
¯the case p , p(d ) , p in which, by Proposition 5, country I’s optimal strategyI II
T T* *in period T is r 5 0 and country II’s is r 5 1 (the proofs for the casesI II
T T T
¯ ¯p , p(d ) , p and p , p(d ) for i 5 I,II use similar arguments).II I i
T21*Claim 1 : 0 , r , 1.i
T21Proof. If r 5 1, then an agreement would be reached at date T 2 1, whichI
T21 T21 T
contradicts our assumption. On the other hand, if r 5 0, then p 5 p . ButI I I
T T21
¯since p , p(d ), the optimal strategy of country II must be p 5 1, leading toI II
T21*an agreement at date T 2 1, a contradiction. Therefore, 0 , r , 1. SimilarI
T21*arguments can be used to show that 0 , r , 1.II
T21 T
¯Claim 2 : p . p(d ) . p .I I
T21 T T21*Proof. 0 , r , 1 implies p , p through Bayes’ rule. Finally, ifI I I
T21 T21p , p(d ), then r 5 1, which contradicts claim 1.I II
At the beginning of period T (before concession strategies are observed),
country I’s and country II’s average expected welfare given the proposed optimal
period T strategies are respectively given by
T T N T R T R(1 2 d )V 5 p w 1 (1 2 p )dw and (1 2 d )V 5 w . (A.2)I II II II
Let us now move backwards to period T 2 1. By claims 1 and 2, we must have
T21
¯p . p(d ) for both countries, which, by Proposition 5, implies that thei
equilibrium strategies cannot be pure. However, an equilibrium in completely
mixed strategies exists; we construct this equilibrium below. The average welfares
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in period T 2 1 associated with pure concession strategies are as follows. Playing
T21r 5 1 yields country IIII
T21 T21 T21 T21 R
¯p r w(d ) 1 (1 2 p r )w , (A.3)I I I I
T21
while r 5 0 yieldsII
T21 T21 N T21 T21 Rp r w 1 (1 2 p r )dw , (A.4)I I I I
T T* *given that r 5 0 and r 5 1. Similarly,I II
T21 T21 T21 T21 R
¯p r w(d ) 1 (1 2 p r )w (A.5)II II II II
T21is what country I would expect on average from r 5 1, and using Eqs. (A.2),I
T21 T21 N T21 T21 T N T Rp r w 1 (1 2 p r )d(p w 1 (1 2 p )dw ), (A.6)II II II II II II
T21from playing r 5 0.I
T N T R RClaim 3 : d [p w 1 (1 2 p )dw ] , w .II II
N
¯Proof. Assume the contrary. d , d implies w(d ) , w , and we have thec
expression in Eq. (A.6) exceeding Eq. (A.5). The optimum strategy for country I is
T21 T *then r 5 0. But since r 5 0 too, country II would be better off by settingI I
T21r 5 1 (conceding in period T 2 1), and an agreement would be reached, whichII
contradicts claim 1.
T21
¯Now, given the result in claim 3 and p . p(d ) for i 5 I,II, there must existi
T21*numbers 0 , r , 1, such thati
N
¯1 w 2 w(d )T21 ]] ]]]*r 5 / 1 1 , andS DI T21 RS Dp (1 2 d )wI
N
¯1 w 2 w(d )T21 ]] ]]]]]]]]]*r 5 / 1 1 .S DII T21 R T N T RS Dp w 2 d(p w 1 (1 2 p )dw )II II II
These strategies are determined using Eqs. (A.3) and (A.4) and Eqs. (A.5) and
(A.6), and are unique. Thus the respective welfares of the two countries,
T21 T21 T21* *discounted to T 2 1, are V 5 r (Eq. (A.5)) 1 (1 2 r ) (Eq. (A.6)) andI I I
T21 T21 T21 T21 T21* * * *V 5 r (Eq. (A.3)) 1 (1 2 r ) (Eq. (A.4)). Clearly, r and rII II II I II
are best replies to each other, and beliefs are consistent; we have constructed the
T21 T21portion of the PBE path for the periods T and T 2 1. Given V and V , we canI II
proceed to period T 2 2 and determine the optimal (mixed) concession strategies,
using Bayes’ rule for updating beliefs as we did for period T 2 1. Carrying this
process inductively until period one should lead us to the initial conditions
1 1described by p , p , and d , d . The concession game ending at period T is aI II c
finite game, thus the number of Nash equilibria must be odd. Since no equilibrium
in pure concession strategies exists, this number is equal to one. Q.E.D.
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